What Does It Mean to Have a Soul?

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The Germans have a term, *Urwort*, that refers to words for which no precise definition may be readily at hand but that we somehow cannot do without. One of these "primal words" is surely the one I have been asked to reflect on today: "soul." The ambiguity of the term is evident on the very first page of one of the most widely read books in recent decades, *Care of the Soul*, by the psychotherapist Thomas Moore. He writes: "It is impossible to define precisely what the soul is. Definition is an intellectual enterprise anyway; the soul prefers to imagine. We know intuitively that soul has to do with genuineness and depth, as when we say that certain music has soul or a remarkable person is soulful."[1] If we were to ignore his caution and indulge in an intellectual enterprise, we could simply say that soul is the principle or reality that gives life. That, at least, is the traditional understanding. When a person died, it was thought that the soul departed, an event that was sometimes given visual expression by drawings or paintings that showed a dove leaving the body of the deceased. We might be familiar with such depictions in medieval Christian manuscripts, but the notion is not uniquely Christian or Western. A Japanese scholar, Haruyo Inoue, began a recent article with these words: "From ancient times, the Japanese have thought that a living soul dwells within the physical being of a person, and at death, separating from the body, it becomes a dead spirit, for a time existing as a wild and unstable soul. The dead spirit becomes purified as a *kami* (ancestral spirit) through the rites performed for it over a long by the members of its family, whom, as its descendants it ten watches over and protects."[2]

Within our Western philosophical tradition, Aristotle posited various kinds of soul: a vegetative soul that gave life to plants, an animal soul for beings having the power of locomotion, and a rational soul unique to human beings. Influenced by this philosophy, but without accepting Aristotle's position that the personal human soul ceases to exist when one dies, the Catholic Church has traditionally taught that it is only human beings who have a soul directly or immediately created by God, but even those who affirm this clear distinction between humans and other living beings recognize that their affirmation may appear problematic. For example, in an address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences in 1996, Pope John Paul II stated that there is "an ontological difference, an ontological leap" between humans and other animals, but he went on to ask: "However, does not the positing of such ontological discontinuity run counter to that physical continuity which seems to be the main threat of research into evolution in the field of physics and chemistry?"[3] For many students of evolution, the continuity is so striking that those who affirm a direct creation of a human soul at or near the time of conception find it impossible to say just when this first occurred: With *homo habilis* some two and a half million years ago? With *Homo erectus* approximately 500,000 years later? Did Neanderthal man have a soul directly created by God?

In the light of such questions, it is not surprising that contemporary thinkers take a wide variety of positions on the matter of the human soul. At one end of the spectrum are those who simply avoid the question of the soul's existence, not merely because its existence is not scientifically provable but because the very concept appears superfluous and hence unhelpful. Reviewing a book with the provocative title *Whatever Happened to the Soul?* theologian Michael Barnes notes: "The chapters by scientists, in biology and psychology, provide the background for understanding why a body-soul dualism looks increasingly implausible to

account for cognition and choice, and how self-reflective awareness could emerge from the evolutionary history of interpersonal and linguistic relations." Without taking a firm position himself, Barnes does suggest that "if various fields in modern science are rendering the idea of a spiritual soul implausible or at least unnecessary, Christianity must be willing to take this into account."[4] Similarly the philosopher Klaus Kremer, himself a proponent of the reality of the soul, writes that "modern science often considers the notion of the soul as a separate reality to be not only superfluous but even untenable and therefore non-existent."[5] This position has been aggressively advocated by the philosopher Daniel Dennett, who bluntly asserts that "there is only one sort of stuff, namely matter."[6]

One approach that avoids Dennett's materialism on the one hand and, on the other hand, a strict dualism that would consider the body and soul to be two separate substances is the general approach sometimes called "dual-aspect monism" or "non-reductive physicalism." This position, advocated by most of the authors in that earlier-mentioned book *Whatever Happened to the Soul*, has been concisely summarized by theologian Philip Rolnick in the following way:

> A common pattern is that almost all who [take this approach] argue for different "levels," "dimensions," "aspects," or "properties" while claiming to avoid dualism.... Whether monism or dualism is defended, my thesis is that two things will be present in every sensible discussion: some form of *twoness* and a way to *unify* the twoness. The higher level of the twoness can be called an "aspect," "dimension," "property," or "level" of the more basic brain, or described as "duality without dualism." ... But in order to account for the range of human and divine activity, each account will have, under one title or another, some sort of twoness and some basic way to unify the twoness.[7]

Differing from this approach, but yet without opting for a strict dualism such as one finds in the philosophy of René Descartes, is the traditional teaching of the Catholic Church, most forcefully expounded in recent times by Pope Benedict XVI, including works that he published while still known as Joseph Ratzinger. In his book on eschatology, he lamented the fact that the widespread opinion that the notion of the soul is unbiblical had led to the suppression of the term "soul" in the Sacramentary in its liturgy for the dead, just as the term also disappeared from the ritual for burial.[8] (The term has, however, now reappeared in the new Roman Missal, most evidently in the words spoken by the faithful at every Mass just before Communion.)

In that same part of his book, then-Cardinal Ratzinger also indicated just how and why the Aristotelian teaching about the soul came to be modified by St. Thomas Aquinas. For Aristotle, the soul is an "entelechy," an actualization that is so totally dependent on the body (and the body on it) that the two are *one* just as clay is one with the imprint it has received. With the demise of the body, the soul likewise ceases to exist. The only truly spiritual element in the human being according to Aristotle is *nous*, mind, seen not as individual or personal but as a human participation in a divine, transcendent principle, an *anima mundi*. Not surprisingly, a Christian theologian like Aquinas could not accept this aspect of Aristotle's teaching about the soul, so he took the momentous step of arguing that the spiritual aspect of the human person is not a universal "soul of the world" but is at one and the same time something personal and also the form of the body. It is, in other words, a *substantial* form. Ratzinger comments: "Compared with all the conceptions of the soul available in antiquity, this notion of the soul is quite novel. It is a product of Christian faith, and of the exigencies of faith for human thought."[9]

This Thomistic understanding of the relationship between soul and body eventually became normative for Catholic theology. It does not ignore the classic Christian belief in the

resurrection of the body but understands the substantiality of the soul as allowing one to posit the possibility of truly being "with Christ" even in the intermediate period between one's earthly death and the eventual resurrection. Some Protestant denominations, especially ones of Calvinistic provenance, hold a somewhat similar doctrine. Calvin himself wrote: "It is neither lawful nor expedient to inquire too curiously concerning our soul's intermediate state.... Scripture goes no farther than to say that Christ is present with them, and receives them into paradise (cf. John 12:32) that they may obtain consolation.... Let us be content with the limits divinely set for us: namely, that the souls of the pious, having ended the toil of their warfare, enter into blessed rest, where in glad expectation they await the enjoyment of promised glory,..."[10]

The modified dualism of Aquinas is widely held today in many philosophical and theological circles, especially within Catholicism. Even persons who may never have read Thomistic works represent this position in believing, first, that the human soul is directly created by God at or near the time of each human being's conception and, second, that this soul does not cease existing with the death of the body but is—either at once or after a period of purification from the effects of sin—able to enjoy the heavenly bliss traditionally called "the beatific vision," even though this celestial happiness will be further enhanced when the soul is reunited with its body at the resurrection at the end of time. One finds this traditional teaching clearly enunciated in the official *Catechism of the Catholic Church*: "The Church teaches that every spiritual soul is created immediately by God—it is not 'produced' by the parents—and also that it is immortal: it does not perish when it separates from the body at death, and it will be reunited with the body at the final Resurrection."[11]

A concomitant aspect of this teaching is the soul that exists in the "intermediate state" following death is in an incomplete state, such that it desires reunification with the body at the time of the resurrection. Among classic Christian theologians who have given expression to this longing is St. Bernard of Clairvaux, who writes: "Until death is swallowed up in victory [1 Cor. 15:54] and the everlasting light invades the farthest bounds of night and shines everywhere—so that heavenly glory gleams even in bodies—these souls cannot wholly remove themselves and transport themselves to God. They are still too much bound to their bodies, if not in life and feeling, certainly in natural affection. They do not wish to be complete without them, and indeed they cannot be."[12] Roman Catholic doctrine, as commonly understood, holds that only Jesus and his mother Mary have fully entered heavenly bliss "body and soul," the former through his resurrection, the latter in virtue of her assumption (defined infallibly as Catholic doctrine by Pope Pius XII in 1950). Because saints other than Mary are not yet in heavenly glory in this fullest sense, strict Thomistic doctrine holds that prayers to them are not really addressed to them as persons. The Catholic philosopher Wolfgang Kluxen notes in this connection that since the separated soul is no longer a "person" (which by definition implies a body-soul unity), St. Thomas is consistent in teaching that the souls of the saints that are now enjoying the beatific vision have a "personal" aspect only insofar as these souls were once constitutive of persons on earth and will again be such after the resurrection of the body. "Nevertheless," he writes, "the soul of St. Peter, to whom the Church prays, is not St. Peter."[13]

Since the liturgy of the Catholic Church does not make this kind of distinction between prayers to Mary and those to other saints (as in the Litany of the Saints), and since most members of the church probably do not make this distinction in their private devotions either,[14] a helpful entrée into the question of the state of those who have died may be found in the church's

teaching about Mary. In one of his earliest published articles, the German theologian Karl Rahner asked just what was actually meant by the defined dogma of Mary's assumption into heaven "body and soul." He argues that the fundamental meaning is that "Mary in her entire being is already where perfect redemption exists, entirely in that region of being which came to be through Christ's Resurrection."[15] This "privilege" is unique to her "in virtue of her divine Motherhood and her unique position in saving history," but this does not necessarily mean that the state of being in the fullness of redemption "body and soul," that is, in one's entire being, cannot be affirmed of other holy persons as well. Rahner points to the passage in Matthew's Gospel (27:51-53) that affirms that at the time of Jesus' death the earth shook, the tombs were opened, and "many bodies of the saints who had fallen asleep were raised." To be sure, scripture scholars regularly point out that earthquakes, the opening of tombs, and the raising of the dead are part of the common "furniture" of apocalyptic descriptions of the end-time in intertestamental literature,[16] but both Rahner and some prominent scripture scholars insist that the Matthean text is an integral part of the properly Christian understanding of the definitive, eschatological significance of Jesus' death. In John Meier's words, these signs and wonders worked by God in response to Jesus' death "are not just superficial apocalyptic color" but are "Matthew's way of affirming that, with the death of the Son, a new age has broken into the old," with the dead rising "in a proleptic final resurrection."[17] A seventeenth-century Doctor of the Church, St. Francis de Sales, was writing out of a similar conviction when, in a spiritual conference about St. Joseph, he averred that "this glorious saint has much influence in Heaven with the One [Jesus] who so favored him that he raised him there in body and in soul," for "how could He who had been so obedient to St. Joseph throughout His life refuse him this grace?"[18]

In affirming this, Francis de Sales undoubtedly assumed that the bodily remains of St. Joseph did not in any sense remain on earth, but the more fundamental truth that Francis and the evangelist Matthew are teaching is surely that those who have led truly holy lives on earth are even now so fully in God's presence that they can be said to be there "body and soul" even if their corpse rests in a grave. This was one of Rahner's main points when, toward the end of the above-mentioned article, he wrote that Mary's "privilege" does *not* mean that "Mary alone enjoyed it" or that what she experienced was something that in the case of other holy persons "could only 'really' emerge later. On the contrary: salvation has already advanced so far historically that since the Resurrection it is completely 'normal' (which is not to say 'general') that there should be men [and women] in whom sin and death have already been definitively overcome."[19] Christ's entry into eternal glory "institutes a bodily community of the redeemed," however far from complete the number of them may already be. Rahner did not claim that entry into the "bodily community of the redeemed" could be affirmed of everyone who dies, but only that those who are fully in God's presence may truly be said to be there "body and soul," however incapable we are of forming an idea of the new condition of the body in that state of radical transformation that St. Paul referred to with the expression "spiritual body" (*sōma pneumatikon*) (1 Cor. 15:44).[20]

However radical this suggestion may appear from the point of view of classical Catholic theology, it does correlate well with the basic conviction that the saints really are already fully with God. It likewise avoids the need for pointless speculations about how or when billions of bodies of deceased human beings might suddenly be raised up on earth. There was a time when serious consideration was given to determining the precise location where all the bodies of the risen would be gathered at the "general resurrection" (usually in the vicinity of Jerusalem). What

we now know of the vast numbers of human beings who have ever lived, and of the possibly billions more who will one day live on earth or even elsewhere in the cosmos, makes such speculation seem absurdly quaint if not absolutely incredible. The avoidance of even the need for such theorizing is surely a major advantage of the line of thinking opened up by Rahner's article on Mary's assumption. What, however, does this approach mean for our understanding of the soul and its relationship with the body?

As an approach to answering this question in a way that is consonant with the main tenets of Christian eschatology, it is helpful to start with the fact that the biblical view of the human person is basically not dualistic. As Joseph Ratzinger himself wrote in an early article, "biblical thought presupposes an indivisible unity of man; for example, the Bible has no term which signifies only the body (separated and differentiated from the soul); vice versa, the word 'soul' always means the whole man existing bodily."[21] According to this perspective, which is shared by much contemporary philosophy, body and soul are two *aspects* or elements of *the one* human person, the body being the *expression* of the soul, the human soul being what Ratzinger elsewhere termed our "capacity for relatedness with truth, with love eternal."[22] By not seeing body and soul as two separate entities and accordingly recognizing that an element of bodiliness is an integral aspect of the soul just as an element of interiority is an integral aspect of the body, it becomes possible to argue that at death the soul does not simply abandon this bodily aspect, even though the spatio-temporal conditions characteristic of earthly life then come to an end.

A number of theologians refer to this possibility as "resurrection in death." One of the objections to this understanding comes from Ratzinger. Although he seems to have been favorably disposed toward this notion when he wrote his above-quoted article on resurrection in the late 1960s, he later argued that a typical Christian believer could not possibly believe that a

dead friend, whom he has seen buried, has been resurrected. To argue thus, he said, would be to resort to typical academic terminology, *lingua docta*, which simply cannot express a "common and commonly understood faith."[23] This does not seem to be a conclusive objection, however, since in fact some Christians in the early Church did claim in their "common faith" to have seen martyrs not only die but also appear as bodily resurrected.[24] This is not to say that such appearances portrayed the actual nature of a resurrected body, for there seems to be no way for a believer to *know* exactly what the fullness of life with God is like. St. Paul's words about seeing now "in a mirror, dimly" (1 Cor. 13:12) must never be forgotten when one tries to give some expression to this aspect of Christian faith. Nevertheless, the abiding conviction of many believers that the saints are already now fully with God does lend support to the notion of "resurrection in death."

This conviction also correlates well with the overall direction of contemporary philosophy. As Karl Rahner once wrote, "in view of its understanding of the unity of man, modern metaphysical anthropology can never (or only with the greatest reservations) consider that an intermediate state, or an absolutely non-material mode of existence on the part of the spiritual subject, is possible."[25] What Rahner said of metaphysical anthropology could surely be said of the conviction of many persons in general, even ones not philosophically trained. The notion of an absolutely disembodied soul existing in an "intermediate state" until some time in the future when the bodies of all the human beings who ever lived will suddenly be raised up can all too readily seem completely unbelievable. Rahner concludes his article on the intermediate state by saying that "it is impossible to overlook the difficulties many people find in this idea today. For these people it may be a help to say that the idea is not really strictly binding from a theological point of view, and that consequently it is open to the individual believer to follow the

theological arguments which he finds convincing."[26] It is not a matter of watering down the faith, which will always pose ineluctable challenges, but of ensuring that what is taught as being necessarily "of faith" is truly so.

Since this conference is intended primarily for Catholic ministers, I want to add here some pastoral reflections. First of all, and granted the difficulty of defining the term exactly, the word "soul" should surely remain part of our vocabulary. An absolutely essential part of our Catholic Christian faith is that we are not here for this earthly life alone. As St. Paul writes so forcefully in the 15th chapter of First Corinthians, "If for this life only we have hoped in Christ, we are the most pitiable people of all" (1 Cor 15:19), something that the first Preface in Masses for the Dead echoes in the words: "Lord, for your faithful people life is changed, not ended. When the body of our earthly dwelling lies in death, we can an everlasting dwelling place in heaven." Among other things, the language of "soul" helps keep this transcendent aspect of the human person before our eyes and in our hearts.

Second, it would surely be counterproductive in homilies or spiritual conferences to go into the details of the different positions of Joseph Ratzinger/Pope Benedict XVI on the one hand and Karl Rahner on the other hand. Pope Benedict, along with members of the International Theological Commission, are concerned that talk about "resurrection in death" will just confuse most members of the Church, although, as we have seen, someone like Rahner was worried that insistence on believing something that seems simply incredible to many persons today would actually be detrimental to *their* faith. This means, I suggest, that the issue could be raised in smaller study groups for persons really interested in one of the more fascinating topics in contemporary theology. Professor Philip Rolnick of St. Thomas University in St. Paul, Minnesota, has some helpful words on this when he writes:

> Let us remember that what sparks the original entrance of "soul" language into the New Testament and the following Christian tradition is a concern for more than this life alone. Let us remove the "Cartesian" straw man and think instead about Paul, other New Testament writers, the Patristic leaders of the church, and Aquinas. These Christian writers do not endorse dualism, but rather, emphasize the connectedness of the soul to the body in this life, and insist on some form of embodiment in the next.... Regardless of the terminology used to characterize a position, anyone who does not completely capitulate to materialism must assert the *reality* of the higher level. Once a higher level is asserted, one's preferred label is of secondary importance. Whatever form of twoness is proposed is not the final word, because the twoness will be enveloped in a greater unity.

There is a well-known adage, often attributed to St. Augustine but apparently stemming from the 17th-century Lutheran theologian Rupertus Meldenius, that was quoted by Pope John XXIII in his first encyclical and is surely a good rule of thumb in delicate issues like the one we are considering here today: In essentials, unity; in doubtful matters, liberty; in all things, charity.[27]

I would now like to conclude with some brief reflections on a related issue. I earlier noted the continuity between human and other forms of animate life that is so striking to many scientists today and that was alluded to by Pope John Paull II in that 1996 address to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences. Thus far in my presentation I have referred only to the issue of eternal life with God for humans. Might one extend this possibility to other kinds of living creatures? In traditional Christian theology, heavenly bliss was regularly restricted to humans,

since they alone were believed to be made in the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1:26). All other living beings were generally thought simply to fall into nothingness at the time of death. One might nevertheless ask if this is really so. I am fully aware that this kind of question may at first sight seem rather fanciful, the kind of question that might concern a child who hopes her deceased pet is "in heaven" but that is irrelevant to mature persons. All the same, some insights into the full meaning of Christian faith may be gleaned from reflecting on this point.

In the eighteenth century, John Wesley remarked in one of his sermons that when the Book of Revelation speaks of God's ultimately making "all things new" (Rev. 21:5), "the following blessing shall take place (not only on the children of men; there is no such restriction in the text; but) on every creature according to its capacity: 'God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes. And there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain: for the former things are passed away." Then, he adds, "the whole brute creation" will enjoy happiness "suited to their state, without alloy, without interruption, and without end."[28] More recently, others have made a similar argument on the basis of another scriptural text, the passage in Luke's Gospel where Jesus asks: "Are not five sparrows sold for two pennies? And not one of them is forgotten before God" (Lk. 12:6). Petroc and Eldred Willey suggest that since this divine "remembering" of creatures could be said to be the same as God's knowledge of them, and since being known by the eternal God could comprise immortality, then some kind of immortality might be available to creatures other than human beings alone.[29] The Greek Orthodox theologian and bishop Kallistos Ware makes a similar point, referring to the same passage in Luke: "Was Greek Christianity justified in denying immortality to animals? Christ says that not a single sparrow is 'forgotten in God's sight'; God is concerned about the death of each one of them (Luke 12:6; Matt. 10:29). Christ does not say

that sparrows have immortal life, but he does not deny the possibility. If the New Testament leaves the question open, should not we?"[30] One further text is often cited by authors who are open to the possibility of some kind of everlasting life "with God" on the part of other creatures, namely, Isaiah's vision of a peaceable kingdom where the wolf and the lamb, the calf and the young lion and all other creatures abide in harmony (Is. 11:6-9). Commenting on this passage, Thomas Hosinski writes: "This vision and promise allows us to hope that the highest aspect of God's providential care—ultimate redemption and inclusion in the everlasting life of God's 'kingdom'—will in fact be extended to all God's creatures."[31]

None of these authors write apodictically, though they certainly would object to dogmatic statements that some form of what the Christian liturgy calls "everlasting life" is necessarily and certainly reserved for human beings alone. A crucial phrase is surely one found in the quotation from Wesley—"suited to their state," that is, according to their capacity. It has long been common Christian teaching that those who enjoy heavenly bliss "with the Lord" do not all enjoy it in the same measure or to the same degree but rather according to each one's capacity. A deceased infant would not enjoy the *visio beatifica* in the same way as St. Francis of Assisi or St. Teresa of Avila. In one of the most beautiful passages in Dante's *Paradiso*, the poet asks a saint in the lower region of heaven if she is not envious of those who are still more exalted. Piccarda replies: "Brother, the power of love quiets our will and makes us wish only for that which we have and gives us no other thirst.... It is the essence of this blessed existence to keep itself within the divine will, whereby our wills themselves are made one; so that our being thus from threshold to threshold throughout this realm is a joy to all the realm as to the King, who draws our wills to what He wills; and in his will is our peace."[32] In the final analysis, theologians like Ware and Hosinski are asking us to reflect on the possibility that some degree of being "with the

Lord" everlastingly may extend to creatures beyond the species *Homo sapiens*. However little urgency or "practical" value such reflections may seem to have, they at least open up the possibility that the *physical* continuity that has been so evident in scientific study of living beings can be understood philosophically and theologically as being reflected in a kind of *spiritual* continuity as well. At the very least, an openness to this avoids what one author has called "the plain absurdity, no less, of humans deciding for themselves which essential or substantial qualities qualify them for eternal life and which may or may not exclude animals.... Eternal life is God's own gift; it is not something which we can merit."[33] It was surely an awareness of this that allowed a saintly mystic like Francis of Assisi to address not only his fellow human beings but also the birds, the fish, and even a wolf as his true "brothers" and "sisters."

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[1] Thomas Moore, *Care of the Soul* (New York: HarperCollins, 1992), xi.

[2] Haruoy Inoue, "Rituals for the Dead Today," *Dharma World* 38 (Oct.-Dec. 2011), 12.

[3] Pope John Paul II, "Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences on Evolution," *Origins: Catholic News Service* 26.22 (24 November 1996): 352.

[4] Michael H. Barnes, review of *Whatever Happened to the Soul?* ed. Warren S. Brown et al., *Horizons: Journal of the College Theology Society* 26 (1999):386.

[5] Klaus Kremer, "Zur Einführung: Die Problemlage und die Aufgabe," in *Seele: Ihre Wirklichkeit, ihr Verhältnis zum Leib und zur menschlichen Person*, ed. idem (Leiden and Cologne: Brill, 1984), 8.

[6] Daniel Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (New York: Little, Brown, 1991), 33.

[7] Philip Rolnick, "Brain, Mind, Soul, and Spirit—Unified in Personality," *The Global Spiral*

[8] Joseph Ratzinter, *Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life*, trans. Michael Waldstein (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1988), 105.

[9] Ratzinger, *Eschatology*, 149.

[10] John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (1559 ed.) 3.25.5 (trans. Ford Lewis Battles in *Calvin's Institutes: A New Compend*, ed. Hugh T. Kerr [Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989], 124).

[11] *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, no. 366 (New York: Paulist Press, 1994), 93. The footnote to this passage refers to Pope Pius XII's encyclical *Humani Generis*, to Pope Paul VI's *Credo of the People of God*, and to the decrees of the Fifth Lateran Council (1513).

[12] Bernard of Clairvaux, *On Loving God* XI.30, in *Bernard of Clairvaux: Selected Works*, trans. G.R. Evans (New York: Paulist, 1987), 197.

[13] Wolfgang Kluxen, "Seele und Unsterblichkeit bei Thomas von Aquin," in Kremer, ed., *Seele* (note 9), 83.

[14] A.R. van de Walle writes: "No one who has a personal devotion for a particular saint thinks for a moment that this saint is not completely happy but is still yearning for the resurrection of the body. Moreover, in popular piety saints normally appear as *human beings*. People regularly and easily consider them to be glorified human beings in heaven. One never thinks of them as souls" (*Bis zum Anbruch der Morgenröte: Grundriss einer christlichen Eschatologie*, quoted by Greshake, *Resurrectio Mortuorum* [note 25], 268).

[15] Karl Rahner, "The Interpretation of the Dogma of the Assumption," in idem, *Theological Investigations*, vol. 1, trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P. (Baltimore: Helicon, 1961), 225.

[16] See, e.g., Donald Senior, O.P., "The Death of Jesus and the Resurrection of the Holy Ones (Mt 27:51-53)," *The Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 38 (1976):314.

[17] John Meier, *The Vision of Matthew: Christ, Church, and Morality in the First Gospel* (New York: Paulist Press, 1979), 204-5.

[18] St. Francis de Sales, "Sur les vertus de saint Joseph," in *Oeuvres de saint François de Sales*, vol. 6, *Les vrays entretiens spirituels* (Annecy: J. Niérat, 1895), 369.

[19] Rahner, "Interpretation of the Dogma," 226.

[20] Saying that not everyone who dies necessarily enters into the "community of the redeemed" raises not only the question of the possibility of eternal damnation for persons who may have utterly closed themselves to God's offer of communion but also the issue of a purificatory state (Purgatory) and whether it makes sense to speak of this in terms of temporal duration rather than of "intensive purgation" at the time of death. It would not be germane to enter into these questions here. For the reflections of one prominent theologian on the question of a purificatory state, see Karl Rahner, "Purgatory," in idem, *Theological Investigations*, vol. 19, trans. Edward Quinn (New York: Crossroad, 1983), 181-93.

[21] Joseph Ratzinger, "Resurrection: B. Theological," in *Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 5:340.

[22] Ratzinger, *Eschatology*, 259.

[23] Ratzinger, "Zwischen Tod und Auferstehung," *Internationale katholische Zeitschrift: Communio* 9 (1980):218, quoted by Greshake, *Resurrectio Mortuorum*, 267.

[24] For examples drawn from the acts of early martyrs like Pionios and Fructuosus (both 3rd century), see Greshake, *Resurrectio Mortuorum*, 182-83.

[25] Karl Rahner, "The Intermediate State," in idem, *Theological Investigations*, vol. 17, trans. Margaret Kohl (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 121.

[26] Ibid., 124.

[27] Pope John XXIII, *In Petri cathedram*, no. 72.

[28] John Wesley, "The General Deliverance," in idem, *Sermons on Several Occasions*, vol. 2 (London: Wesleyan Conference Office, 1874), 281-86, anthologized in *Animals and Christianity: A Book of Readings*, ed. Andrew Linzey and Tom Regan (New York: Crossroad, 1988), 102-3.

[29] Petroc Willey and Eldred Willey, "Will Animals Be Redeemed?" in Andrew Linzey and Dorothy Yamamoto, eds., *Animals on the Agenda: Questions about Animals for Theology and Ethics* (London: SCM Press, 1998), 194.

[30] Kallistos Ware, "The Soul in Greek Christianity," in Crabbe, ed., *From Soul to Self* (note 20), 64.

[31] Thomas E. Hosinski, "How Does God's Providential Care Extend to Animals?" in Linzey and Yamamoto, eds., *Animals on the Agenda* (note 60), 143.

[32] Dante, *Paradiso* 3:70-72, 79-85 (trans. Charles S. Singleton [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975], 31-33).

[33] Andrew Linzey, Introduction to part three of *Animals on the Agenda* (note 60), 119.